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with the owner furnishes no reason why the negligence of the latter
should be excused.' "4s Therefore, Johnson v. Hassett," relying
on the rationale of Brown v. Merlo,45 should be viewed as a prece-
dent-setting ruling by other courts in North Dakota.
The purposes of the guest statutes were to prevent "the pro-
verbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him,"46
and to prevent collusive suits. However, the statutes go much fur-
ther. Recovery under these statutes is denied in every case where
the passenger is a gratuitous guest and the defendant is guilty
only of negligence. As a result, many claims where no collusion
is attempted or no ingratitude is shown are forbidden in their incep-
tion, and the burden of loss is shifted to the one who is less able
to withstand it. Furthermore, the courts had difficulty in applying
the statutes and as a result every state has a unique statute buried
in confused case law.4 7 The courts have also had problems harmon-
izing the provisions of the guest statutes and the common law, since
our law has long held that one who undertakes to act must act
with a due regard for the safety of others. The value that our people
place on human life and safety is clear. The ruling in the instant
case is important precedent for the abolition of the guest statute
which can no longer be justified either legally or socially.
MARY MUEHLEN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC SCHOOLS-A' CHALLENGE TO PREFEREN-
TIAL MINORITY ADMISSIONS
Petitioner was denied admission to the first-year class at the
University of Washington School of Law.' He alleged that lesser
qualified minority students were admitted to the class as a result
43. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 867, 506 P.2d 212, 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 396 (1973),
quoting Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1934).
44. Johnson v. Hassett, No. 138A (Ramsey County, N.D., Aug. 2, 1978), appeal docketed,
No. 8968, N.D. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18, 1973.
45. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
46. Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 2d 81, 87, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930).
47. Among the various problems confronting the courts are: Can an owner be a guest
in his own car if someone else is driving? What if a child is not old enough to know that
he is a guest? What about a guest who wants to get out of a car but is not allowed to
do so? Is a guest who is injured a moment after he leaves the car still a "guest"? The
problems appear endless.
1. The Court found that, on the facts presented, petitioner had standing to sue. Although
there was no way of telling whether petitioner would have been admitted to the class re-
gardless of the number of minority students accepted, his interest constituted the requisite
"personal stake . . . to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely tdepends for illumination of difficult. constitutional
questions." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 (1973), quoting Baker
v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ; accord. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 88, 99 (1968).
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of the preferential admissions policy employed.2 After respondent
law schools had been temporarily enjoined' from filling petitioner's
position, the Superior Court of Washington for Kings County ruled
that the school had discriminated against petitioner in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and ordered his admission three days
following the commencement of the 1971-72 school year.5 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Washington held, inter alia, that the racial
and ethnic background of applicants could be considered by the law
school as one factor in selecting its student body. DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
In considering the constitutionality of preferential minority ad-
missions, the threshhold question is whether a state law school
can create racial classifications or whether it must be neutral and
color blind in its approach. There is some authority for the view
that the Constitution is "color-blind" and that therefore racial
classifications may not be used for any governmental? purpose. This
position created a constitutional dilemma, however, in that neutral
responses to prior discrimination reinforced its effects, but affirma-
2. The court dismissed petitioner's due process attack on other admissions procedures.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1187 (1973).
In considering the applicant files, the Law School Admissions Committee removed the
files of those applicants who had identified themselves as members of minority races, to be
considered by a sub-group of the committee deemed particularly competent to evaluate
them. Within this group were some applicants whose mechanical credentials were lower
than some of the non-minority applicants but whose records showed the committee they
had a high probability of succeeding in law school.
Minority and non-minority applicants' records were then subjected to a formula con-
sisting of a combination of Junior-Senior grade-point averages and scores from the na-
tionally-administered Law School Admissions Test. These two factors combined to provide
a " predicted first-year average." In close cases, the law school took into account such
things as recommendation letters, academic standards of the undergraduate school attended,
and quality and consistency of academic records. Id. at 1173-75.
3. Defendants in the original action included the President of the University of. Wash-
ington; Dean of the University of Washington Law School; three members of the Law
School Admissions Committee; seven Regents of the University; the Registrar of the Uni-
versity: and the University of Washington. Brief of Respondents a't 1, DeFunis v4 Odegaard,
82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
4. It is to be noted that Mr. DeFunis is currently in his final year at the law school by
reason of the initial order entered by the Superior Court of the State of Washington. The
-order, though reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, is still in effect
due to the stay entered pending final determination by the United States Supreme Court.
Respondents' Brief for Motion of Dismissal of Appeal at 6, DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 73-235
(U.S.SuD.Ct., filed Sept. 12, 1973).
5. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 2169, 1172 (1973) ; Note, 52 B.U.L.
REv. 304 (1972).
6. Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Har-
lan was writing in the context of discrimination against, rather than preferential treatment
for, minority groups; but the interpretation of the equal protection clause over the years
has suggested that the motive behind a racial classificalon may be irrelevant. O'Neil,
Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access to Legal Education, 1970 U.ToL. L. Rxv. 281, 288.
7. The law school officials are delegates of broad discretionary power granted by the
legislature to the regents of the university to establish admissions requirements. WASw.
REv. COPE ANN. § 28 B.10.050 (1970).
In support of its motion to dismiss the appeal now before the United States Supreme
Court, the respondents argue that "this 'policy' should not be equated with a 'legislative
act'. . . . The real act challenged here is the discretionary one .. " Respondents' Brief,
supra note 4, at 8. However, it does not follow from the fact that an act is discretionary
that it is not state action challengeable in the courts. See Ely, Legislative and !Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALm L.J. 1205, 1254-69 (1970).
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tive efforts to redress the balance produced inequality of a different
sort." As a result, the United States Supreme Court began to
recognize that formal equality often results in great inequality.0
Consequently, in determining what courses of action should be avail-
able in solving the problems arising from past discrimination, it is
necessary to look behind the classification.10
At first glance, Brown v. Board of Education" might be read to
prohibit color classifications in educational matters entirely. Recent
decisions, however, have undermined such an interpretation by re-
quiring the state to be color conscious to undo previous unconstitu-
tional discrimination.1 Where a racial classification has been used
to insure against rather than to promote deprivation of equal ed-
ucational opportunity, it has generally been upheld.3 In this light,
the principle of color blindness forbids discrimination only when valid
reasons cannot be given to justify the differential treatment."
8. O'Neil, supra note 6, at 281.
9. The term "formal equality" as used herein is intended to mean that the same stand-
ards are applied to all men, regardless of race. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World,
61 Nw.U. L. RIv. 363 (1966).
10. See Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964).
The court upheld a Virginia law requiring that every divorce decree indicate the race of
the husband and wife. The designation of race aided "vital statistics." And, in Brooks v.
Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966). the court permitted systematic inclusion of black jurors
in the trial of a black defendant.
These two cases suggest that racial classifications are not per se unconstitutional,
even though the purpose may be to maintain separate records based on racial data. How-
ever, In such analogous contexts, members of the majority suffered little, if at all, from
explicit racial preference so that the impact may have been far less discriminatory than
in the instant case. Furthermore, in these cases the agency using the classification had a
constitutional duty to achieve racial balance. O'Neil, supra note 6, at 289-93.
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 947 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. E.g., Green v. County School Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en bane, 880 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1967). cert. denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967) ; G. GUN'rnx & N. DOWLING, CONSTrU-
TIONAL LAw 1416 (8th ed. 1970).
13. See cases cited, note 12 supra.
14. Three standards have been developed by the Court for review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: (1) permissive review under the rational basis test; (2) per se unconstitu-
tional position; (3) strict review under the compelling state interest test.
The permissive standard is used only in cases of "benign" discrimination when the
classification works in favor of a group. In DeFunis, the court discarded this alternative
because the preferential admissions policy works a hardship on certain non-minority appli-
cants who may be displaced by minority students with comparable or inferior qualifica-
tions.
By reading Brown as holding that only those racial classifications that stigmatize a
racial group with the stamp of inferiority are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington refuted the lower court's position that the use of race is per se unconstitutional. The
court referred to an article by O'Neil which stated:
Preferential admissions do not represent a covert attempt to stigmatize the ma-
jority race as inferior; nor is it reasonable to expect that the possible effect of
the extension of educational preference to certain disadvantaged racial minori-
ties will be to stigmatize whites.
O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Edu-
cation, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 713 (1971). However, the O'Neil article goes on to say that stig-
matization is largely a sociological question which requires an examination of the overall
situation. While the court found that preferential admissions does not stigmatize whites, it
failed to consider whether such a policy can stigmatize minority group students.
In the instant case, the court applied the third alternative for review. Application of
the strict standard required asking two questions: whether or not (a) there is a compelling
state interest; and (b) less restrictive means would serve the governmental interest. While
the court expressly applied the strict standard, its analysis of DeFunis failed to consider
possible alternative measures to attain the desired end. On the basis of the incomplete
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In the instant case, Brown provided a starting point but was not
dispositive. 15 To uphold the admissions policy"s of the University of
Washington, the court used a two-pronged test.17 It appeared to
focus both on the goal of the differential treatment, by asking whether
the state had a "compelling interest" in eliminating racial im-
balance within public legal education, 8 and the means of implement-
ing that goal, or the effectiveness1 9 of the preferential policy em-
ployed. For the school to take into account the race of the applicants,
it must show that such a consideration necessarily accomplishes a
compelling state interest. Because the law school had made such a
showing, the court ruled that the policy could stand.20
In declaring the minority admissions policy to be constitutionally
permissible,21 the court enunciated three reasons upon which it based
its determination:
1. The underrepresentation2 2 of minority group members in the
legal profession is being perpetuated by the shortage28 of minority
2 '
law students.
factual record, it would appear to be premature for the court to conclude, as it did, that
"[n]o less restrictive means would serve the governmental interest here." DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1978) ; O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equal-
izing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 713 (1971)
Note, 52 B.U. L. REv. 304 (1972).
15. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1973).
16. An analogy can be drawn between the establishment of a preferential admissions
policy and the establishment of a preferential hiring and promotion plan designed to benefit
minority workers. Recently the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
ruled against such a system.
The non-Indian plainiffs, longtime employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, chal-
lenged a policy which gave preference to persons of one-quarter or more Indian blood in
initial hiring, training, promotion, and reinstatement. While the question before the court
was whether. the statute on which the policy was based must give way to the Civil Rights
Acts, the court stated that "the statute would also fail on constitutional grounds under
these circumstances." This case is highly pertinent because it brought the issue of preferen-
tial treatment squarely before a federal court. In reaching its decision, the court attacked
the premise in the instant case, that unless an affirmative, race-conscious effort is made to
include minority group members, they will almost certainly be excluded. See Mancari v.
Morton, 359 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.M. 1973).
17. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher
Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 712 (1971).
18. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182 (1973).
19. Id. at 1180.
20. Id. at 1184.
21. The Court stated,
[t]he question before us is not whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the law school to take affirmative action to eliminate the continuing effects of
de facto segregation; the question is whether the Constitution permits the law
school to remedy racial imbalance through its minority admissions policy.
Id. at 1183. It is arguable, however, that the case for allowing special treatment is so corn-
pelling as to press it toward recognition of a constitutional right. Yet such a position goes
far beyond anything the courts have held. For the moment, however, it is necessary to lay
the foundation for sustaining preferential policies. See O'Neil, supra note 6, at 309.
22. Although 12 per cent of the national population is black, only 1 per cent of the mem-
bers of the legal profession is black. Other minority groups, for which exact figures are
unavailable, are more poorly represented than blacks. Moreover, there are particular areas
of underrepresentation where minority leaders are most needed and yet the shortage Is
greatest. In the outh, where half of all blacks live, only 17 per cent of the black attorneys
can be found. Altogether, the minority group members comprise less than 3 per cent of the
total law scho l environment. Gelihorn, The Law School and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J.
1069, 1073. l
23. In view of the small number of minority lawyers, there is a shortage now by any
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2. The deficit of minority attorneys denies certain racial groups
access to political power. 25
3. The preferential admissions policy is educationally beneficial to
both minority and non-minority students.26
If educational and sociological data can be used to support a find-
ing,21 then other empirical information must be examined to deter-
mine the validity of the court's conclusion that a preferential ad-
missions policy will alleviate these problems. 28
The first reason necessarily assumes that admissions standards
prevent minority group students who have the requisite aptitude from
entering law school. By relaxing the mechanical credentials re-
quired of minority law school applicants, the court reasoned that the
racial imbalance in the legal profession would be corrected.29 How-
ever, the court failed to consider other reasons which have been
advanced to explain the disproportionately small number of minority
law students and lawyers. These reasons include: (1) the discourag-
ing effect of past discrimination; 0 (2) the lack of appeal of the legal
profession to minority college graduates;31 (3) the limited prospects
definition of the word. It is premature to discuss the question of whether the number of
minority lawyers should be directly proportionate to the minority population or when pre-
ferential policies should be discontinued. See Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal
Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U.ToL. L. REV. 377, 381 n. 8.
24. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973). "Minority," as
used herein, includes only four races-Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and Philippine-Americans.
The School of Law limited its application of preferential admissions to those racial minority
groups most in need of help. They based their determination on two factors: (1) the mi-
nority must be underrepresented in the law schools and legal profession, and (2) the mem-
bers of the minority group must be unable to secure admission if strictly subjected to the
standardized mathematical criteria.
Quaere: Is testimony that Asian-Americans can meet the general requirements suffi-
cient to conclude that they need not be treated as minority applicants?
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1183.
27. One's conclusion about the legal support for the proposition of preferential minority
admissions policies depends in part on one's reading of Brown. The Court used sociological
data in Brown to conclude that segregated schools were inherently unequal. Such use of
sociological data to support a finding of a violation of a Constitutional right has been criti-
cized. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955).
By analogy to the instant case, in DeFunis, the court makes many assumptions which
are not based on the Constitution or statutes. The philosophical discussion of these mat-
ters not In the record may be viewed as extending the court's conclusions to controversial
and arguable questions.
28. The court applied the test stated in Green, judging the policy by "its effectiveness."
The court concluded that: "[tihe minority admissions policy of the law school [is] the only
feasible 'plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now'."
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973).
29. Id. at 1184.
30. Historically, discrimination in law schools and the legal profession seems to have dis-
couraged minority college graduates. As a result, minority representation in the practice
of law has been significantly less than in other professions, such as teaching or the min-
istry. While Northern law schools have always been nominally open to blacks, openly dis-
criminatory standards still existed in several Southern schools as late as the 1960's. See
Atwood, Survey of Black Law Student Enrollment, 1971 STUDENT LAwyra J. 18. Gellhorn,
supra note 22, at 1069-70.
31. Serious pressures face minority students who enter law school. Blacks, for example,
have often been called "uncle toms" merely interested in perpetuating the status quo. More-
over, their white classmates may see them as "missionaries" charged with educating fellow
students about what it is like to be a minority group member. By feeling that they were
admitted solely because of race and not because of demonstrated ability or academic
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of the minority lawyer for professional success; 2 (4) insufficiency of
personal financial resources. 83 To ignore these factors may result
in a "misstatement of the problem and a misuse of resources to
the damage of those sought to be helped."34
Secondly, the court found that the shortage of minority lawyers
seriously disadvantages the minority community.85 Taking judicial
notice 6 of the relationship of attorneys to the community,7 the
court assumed that increasing the number of minority attorneys will
directly increase the political power of minority groups. However,
it appears that equalizing the opportunity to enter the legal pro-
fession without equalizing anything else is of limited value.88 Although
it seems to be symbolically important to establish that minority
students can do as well in law school as whites, merely producing
more minority "leaders" does not insure that they will have the
political power necessary to adequately represent the interests of
minority communities. Therefore, instead of accepting the proposi-
tion that power is synonymous with legal training and that legal
training is the key to equality, it is important to recognize that
equality depends largely on other factors. 89
Finally, the court pointed out that the preferential admissions
policy is educationally beneficial.40 The rationale seems to be that
exposure forces diverse people to tolerate and understand those unlike
promise, the self-confidence of such students may further be undermined. However, exper-
ience has shown that when the minority student enrollment reaches a significant enough
percentage of the total law school population, many of these difficulties disappear. See
Gellhorn, oupra note 22, at 1078; O'Neil, supra note 6, at 311-13; McPherson, The Black
Law Student: A Problem of Fidelities, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April, 1970, at 99.
82. Only recently have law firms, business, and government offered jobs to the relatively
small number of minority lawyers. Traditionally, graduates have had trouble finding posi-
tions upon graduation. Many have spent their time in the courtroom, which is only a small
part of the legal arena and an insignificant part of most white attorneys' practices. Gell-
horn, supra note 22, at 1071; Summers, supra note 28, at 387.
33. Undoubtedly, the greatest obstacle to increasing the minority ranks in law schools
is the insufficiency of financial resources of both the minority student and the law school.
Many minority students cannot afford four years of undergraduate work, much less three
more years of law school. Less than half as many go to graduate school as do non-minority
students, and many other fields of graduate study have more funds availablei to subsidize
them than law. Summers, supra, note 23, at 387.
34. Id. at 380.
35. DeFunis v. OdegasXd, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973).
36. Three species of facts fall within the perimeters of judicial notice: (1) those generally
known by all people within the community; (2) facts capable of determination 'by turning
to sources of indisputable accuracy; and (3) "legislative facts" which are hardly indisput-
able but reflect the court's own thinking when faced with the task of creating law based
upon grounds of policy that hinge upon social, economic, political or scientific facts. There
is disagreement among authorities as to whether judicial notice includes only facts which
are indisputably true or also encompasses those more than likely true.
In DePunis, the Court took judicial notice of some things which may or may not be
true, such as, the assumption made that it is necessary to increase the percentage of mi-
nority students in the law school. Thus, much of the decision is based on "legislative facts."
For a lengthy discussion on judicial notice, see MCCORMICK, -VrDENCE 757-82 (2d ed.
1972) ; aee also Brief for Respondents at 34, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169 (1973).
37. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1183 (1973).
38. C. JENCxS, INEQuALITY: A REAsSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN
AMMRICA 37 (1972).
39. See JENCKs, supra note 38, at 7, 30.
40. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1183 (1973).
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themselves. Assuming that there are substantial educational values
in having minority students in law classes,41 this may be an educa-
tional benefit primarily to the non-minority student.4 2 Because of his
status in the law school and pressures on him, the result for the
minority student may be quite the contrary.
48
To eliminate powerlessness and underrepresentation among the
minority population and to enhance the training of all law students,
the court concludes that legal education must be provided those
minority groups which have been previously denied." In so reason-
ing, the court has overstated its justifications and has failed to focus
on other pertinent factors contributing to these problems. As a result,
the court is unrealistic in predicting the impact of this policy. With-
out knowing the future response4 5 of law schools46 and society to
accommodate the needs and capabilities of minority students, it is
premature to assess the effects of DeFunis. However, it should be
emphasized that preferential admissions ought to be regarded as a
short-term measure. Granting the evils of the present situation, it
must not be assumed that such a policy may be substituted for
additional and more effective means 47 that, combined with the el-
41. There is extremely scanty evidence that tolerance and understanding are developed
by exposing students to people unlike themselves. Even though school desegregation in-
creases tension in the short run, some people argue that the exposure forces diverse people
to accept the fact that they have to live with one another. However, there is no way to
judge whether this in fact happens and whether it ultimately will be a good thing for
society. JENCKS, supra note 38, at 31.
42. Most minority students come from different backgrounds, thus presenting another
perspective on legal problems and institutions. They can enrich class discussions If they
participate freely by sharing their sensitivities to different social values.
43. [B]ecause of his minority status in the law schools and because of pressures
on him from both communities, the black law student is fearful of expressing
himself, or of viewing himself, as an individual. And therefore, he feels respon-
sible for the welfare, the ideas, even the image of those around him like himself....
McPherson, supra note 31, at 99.
44. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184-85 (1973).
45. Professor Bickel suggests that "legal action" has two phases: first, the rule of law
is announced and accepted in principle, and then the rule must be administered through judi-
cial enforcement and other means. According to this view, all law, and especially constitution-
al law, requires a consensual basis. Thus, the majority must agree to comply with the rule in
order to prevent its delay or even reversal. A sufficiently hostile or well-positioned minority
can block its effective implementation. Applied to the school desegregation cases, the period
of delay between Brown I and Brown 11 established symbolic acceptance of integration as
a rule of law before Brown II enforced the substance of the earlier decision. By analogy,
in the Instant case, DeFunis may be only the announcement that law schools must seek to
integrate their student bodies, and the beginning of the period for enforcement of the rule
is yet to come. See generally: Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. 1Ev. 193, 194 (1964) ; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tections, 82 H.ARv. L. REV. 1065, 1151 (1968-69).
46. Increased minority enrollment in law schools has been directly related to the initia-
tive taken by the institutions to attract and motivate such students toward the legal pro-
fession. For example, New York University's black applicants have multiplied sixty-fold
since the school began recruiting and offering scholarships to blacks to attend law school.
Illinois has had similar success.
In addition to revising current recruiting practices, it has been suggested that law
schools must analyze the cultural basis of the legal education offered. That is, there is a
need for multi-cultural education, but the current teaching establishment is biased toward
the Anglo approach. Furthermore, academic administrators are predominantly white, and
they do not question that approach as appropriate for all Americans. See generally Gell-
horn, supra note 22, at 1084-89; McPherson, supra note 81, at 94.
47. See JENCKS, supra 38, at 7.
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imination of gross political inequality, will remove the necessity for
differential treatment of minority group members.
SHERYL RAMSTAD

